Enmore-Hope Village District Council v Shaw et Al
| Jurisdiction | Guyana |
| Judge | Luckhoo, C.,Bollers, C.J.,Persaud, J.A. |
| Judgment Date | 12 August 1974 |
| Neutral Citation | GY 1974 CA 17 |
| Docket Number | Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1974 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Guyana) |
| Date | 12 August 1974 |
Court of Appeal
Luckhoo, C.; Bollers, C.J.; Persaud, J.A.
Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1974
Sir Lionel Luckhoo, S.C., for appellants
Doodnauth Singh for respondents
Administrative Law - Local Authority — Property Appraisement
As is to be expected, the law empowers local authorities whenever necessary to cause properties within their districts to be appraised, to secure the payment of rates if the approved needs of their communities are to be serviced.
In 1972 the Enmore-Hope Village District Council proceeded to have such appraisements made which required duo compliance with certain formalities prescribed by law [then Cap. 150, Local Government Ordinance (Kingdon Edition).] After these appraisements were completed, certain ratepayers of the district challenged their validity because of an alleged failure on the park of the Council to comply with s. 100(2) of the said Ordinance which reads as follows:
“Copies of the appraisement signed by the chairman of the village or country district shall be posted up ire a conspicuous position in the village or country district in such places as are directed by their authority.”
Such copies were indeed posted up, but certain ratepayers felt that it should have been done before and not after the notice of the completion of the appraisement was published in the Official Gazette although the section does not say so. Consequently, an action was brought against the Council seeking:
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(a) A declaration that the purported appraisement by the Council of lots and buildings situate in the Enmore-Hope Village District was a nullity.
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(b) An injunction restraining the Council from acting upon the purported appraisement in any manner whatsoever.
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(c) An order setting aside the said purported appraisement.
No evidence was led, but on an agreed statement in writing the trial judge was asked to determine whether the appraisement was not invalidated by reason of the fact that copies of the signed appraisement were posted up subsequent to the notice of the completion of the appraisement published in the Official Gazette of the 16 th December, 1972. The Council
Council said it was so posted on the 30 th December, 1972, and the ratepayers, on the 3 rd January, 1973. In either case it would have been before the time for appealing had elapsed. The Ordinance was not alleged to have been contravened in any other way.
For the ratepayers it was argued that if it was not the intention of the law that publication of the list should precede notification in the Gazette, how else would the ratepayer know of his appraisement for the purpose of appealing? Further, this alleged contravention was said to hove resulted in an abridgement of the time for appealing, that is, 21 days “from the publication in the Official. Gazette of the completion of the appraisement”, inasmuch as an aggrieved ratepayer would not have had at his disposal the list of appraisements for the full period of 21 days to enable him to formulate his grounds of appeal.
But the Council disputed that there was any non-compliance with s. 100(2), since that section never purported to control the time for appealing, which was specifically designated by s. 101(2)(a). The trial judge was of the opinion that “in order not to deprive an aggrieved ratepayer of arty portion of the time within which he is permitted to appeal the copies of the appraisements should have been posted up either before, or at latest simultaneously with the publication of the notice in the Gazette of the completion of the appraisement.” An order was consequently made granting an injunction “restraining the defendants or their agents or servants from acting upon the individual appraisements, until new copies of the appraisements were hosted either before or simultaneously with a new notice of completion published in the Gazette and the plaintiffs had either not appealed within 21 days thereafter or if they or any of them had so done until they had exhausted the appeal process.”
Because of the stress laid on the significance of s. 100, I would set out what it provided, viz.:
“(1) When the appraisement has been completed, the appraisers shall forthwith transmit it to the overseer of the village or country district, and the overseer shall enter. and record it in a book, hereinafter referred to as the assessment book of the village or country district, as the case may be.
“(2) Copies of the appraisement, signed by the chairman of the village or country district shall be posted up in a conspicuous position in the village or country district on such places as are directed by the authority.
“(3) Notice of the completion of the appraisement shall be published in the Gazette.
“(4) Upon the payment of a fee of twenty-four cents, W person shall be entitled to obtains from the overseer or assistant overseer a certificate of the appraisement of any lot or building 3n a village or country district, and the certificate shall be Prima facie evidence of the matter or thing therein contained.”
And the relevant portion of s, la required that:
“(2) The appeal shall be made –
(a) by filing with the clerk of the count, within twenty-one days after the publication in the Gazette of notice, of the completion of the appraisement, a plaint in writing setting out the grounds of appeal, ……”
Before adverting to the issues, the true import of the judge's order must be understood, for although he did not grant a declaration that the appraisements were a nullity, the restraint and conditions imposed could hardly amount to loss than this:
- That rates were not legally collectable, as the appraisements could not be acted upon because — (a) It was essential to read into s. 100(2) that the notices of appraisements were required to be made at a particular point of time, although there were no words to so indicate and for this purpose there was to be a republication as ordered. (b) It was essential to read into s. 100(3) that the notice of the completion of appraisement was to await the publication of the appraisements, although there were no words so to indicates and for this purpose there was to be a re-publication as ordered. (c) The right to appeal under s. 101(2)(a) could not be exercised unless there was due compliance with what was ordered under (a) and (b), although there were no words to so indicate. 2. That appraisements would only be valid after ratepayers will have had a further opportunity of appealing under s. 101(2)(a), consequent upon the re publication ordered, although there were no words to so indicate.
On the face of it this savours of a grave and radical departure from the plain reading of the relevant legislation. It seeks to incorporate impositions and obligations which do not appear, and to alter the whole concept of the legislation. Can there be any justification for this type of judicial interference in the light of the express provisions of the Ordinance? Or is there not a violation of all recognised and acceptable canons of construction?
Could it be doubted that as a general rule a judge is “not to import into statutes wards which are not to be found there?” /Per Patterson., J, in King v. Burrell (1840) 12 A. & E. 460, at p. 468./ Could it be disputed that there are particular purposes for which one would expect that express language is absolutely indispensable, as, for example where rights are sought to be conferred and obligations imposed whore the statute is unambiguous and unequivocal? And in view of the express provision under s. 101(2)(a), does not the maxim, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, shut the door to the implications introduced?
A court is hardly expected to insert into statutes by implication what is unnecessary and in conflict with its provisions for to do so would not be to construe the act of the Legislature but to alter it. [See Re Sneezun, (1876) 3 Ch. 463, at p. 472.] Neither is a court to presume to take upon itself the office of the Legislature.
As an examples let me look at a decision of the Federal Supreme Court in the matter of Pouderoyen Village Council v. Singh [1961] 3 W.I.R. 178 (an appeal under the said Cap. 150 from the then supreme Court of this country which was asked to decide a question on a principle not dissimilar to what now arises). Gordon, J., the trial judge in that case, declared that the appraisements made were null and void and granted an injunction restraining the appellants from recovering taxes. His decision was bayed on the construction of s. 97(1) of the said Ordinance.
The relevant part of that section reads thus:
“The …… Chairman of the Village Council …… shall cause notices signed by himself, to be posted up in a conspicuous position in the village ……… district …… calling upon the proprietor of every lot and every building as the case may be, which it is proposed to appraise, to deliver to the appraisers …… at a place and on a day (which shall not be less than fourteen days after the date upon which the notices are posted up) specified in the notice, a form duly filled up containing the particulars, which are from time to time approved by the Board, relating to the lots and buildings ……”
The ratepayer had contended that this section, if it was to mean anything, required the local authority to set out in the notice what were the approved particulars or, alternatively, specify in the notice a reasonable time to obtain forms containing those particulars.
Certainly none of the prerequisites which Gordon, J. imposed, or thought necessary so to do, were embodied in that section. Wylie, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court with which Archer, J. and Rennie, J. concurred, explained the matter this way:
“The respondents as I understand the argument, contends, however that one or...
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