Sharma v Parbatie

• Jurisdiction: Guyana
• Judge: Gonsalves-Sabola, J.
• Judgment Date: 19 May 1971
• Neutral Citation: GY 1971 HC 20
• Docket Number: 676 of 1971
• Court: High Court (Guyana)
• Date: 19 May 1971

High Court

Gonsalves-Sabola, J.

676 of 1971

Sharma

and

Parbatie

Mr. E.A. Gunraj for plaintiff.

Mr. M. Fitzpatrick for defendant.

Real property - Landlord and tenant — Rent

Gonsalves-Sabola, J.

1 The plaintiff in his capacity as executor of the Estate of his father Ajodha has sued the defendant for $1,400: being rent due from the defendant for the months of January and February, 1971, under an agreement of lease executed on 1st October, 1969.

2 The defendant admits the tenancy and that the rent sued for was not in fact paid to the plaintiff but contends that there is no recoverable rent in arrears. The defendant says that the contractual rent was so grossly in excess of the standard rent of the demised premises that she has now over-paid, under the lease, an amount more than $6,000 in excess rent. The defendant claims entitlement to set off.

3 It is as clear as daylight that the plaintiff's action must fail if there exists in respect of the letting of the demised premises in question an operative standard rent as claimed by the defendant. But first, let us place the premises in their historical perspective in the light of the facts as found by me.

4 In 1955 or 1956 the demised premises were let as unfurnished business premises by the Estate of J.G. Caetano to one Joseph Phang, known as Budsy Phang, at a monthly rental of $157.39. Up till the time his tenancy of the said premises ended in 1964 Phang carried on therein a betting business known as “Sports and Games”. The Estate of J.G. Caetano sold the premises to Ajodha (deceased) in the year 1960. After Phang's tenancy came to an end, the user of the premises underwent a metamorphosis. Ajodha furnished the premises as a boarding house and employed the defendant as one of his servants therein. Ajodha died in 1967 and his executor, the plaintiff, entered into an agreement of lease with the defendant on 20th September, 1967, which was superseded by another agreement of lease executed on 1st October, 1969. The two documents were admitted in evidence as Exhibits B and A respectively.

5 Except for one room measuring about 10' x 6' and known as the radio room, the premises rented to Phang were identical with those rented to the defendant. The case was argued before me on the footing that the exception of that room from the demised premises was a matter of insignificance for all practical purposes and I accordingly ignore that room. The two leases Exhibits B and A, are identical in terms except that the rental under Exhibit B is $800: per month, whereas that under Exhibit A is $700: per month. The claim before me is one in contract and it is vital to appreciate precisely what are the terms of the agreement which bind the plaintiff and the defendant together in the relationship of landlord and tenant. In the view which I will ultimately take of this case those terms will play a decisive part. A high level of debate on several aspects of rent restriction law was achieved by counsel during the course of the arguments, but having regard to the approach that I will take to the determination of the case it will not be necessary for me to allude to all of them. Mr. Fitzpatrick, counsel for the defendant, made a number of intelligent submissions which reflected a clear insight into the ramifications of the Rent Control Ordinance, and projected for my consideration and judgment some really vital issues in this case. I think it convenient that I should refer to some of his salient propositions. It was submitted:

• (1) That on the authority of Keane v. Clarke [1951] 2 All E.R. 187 the standard rent of the demised premises was $157.39 which was the rent on the first known letting, and no rent in excess thereof was recoverable, unless the landlord established the destruction of the identity of the premises rented to Phang:

• (2) That in Guyana a change of identity of premises could arise in only one of two ways — either by a structural alteration of the premises so substantial that it created new entity, or by a change of user of the premises; such a change of user must be a change of user from one statutory class of premises to another statutory class – for example…… a change from user as dwelling house to user as a commercial building or vice versa. Any change of user that did not cross one of the statutory boundaries was not a sufficient change of user to destroy the standard rent. In particular it was submitted that where the premises were business premises a change merely in the type of business carried on therein was incapable by itself of amounting to a change of user.

6 I was referred to the case of Ng-Yow v. Wrong (1950) L.R.B.G. 161 as authority for the proposition which I accept, that the contract of tenancy is decisive as to the user of Premises.

• (3) That the addition of furniture to unfurnished premises was not sufficient per se to change the identity of the premises so that the standard rent is destroyed.

7 In England prior to the Furnished Houses Rent Control Act, (1946) the supply of furniture, substantial furniture, to unfurnished and therefore...