The State v Scantlebury

• Jurisdiction: Guyana
• Judge: Haynes, C.
• Judgment Date: 06 November 1976
• Neutral Citation: GY 1976 CA 37
• Docket Number: Criminal Appeal No. 109 of 1976
• Court: Court of Appeal (Guyana)
• Date: 06 November 1976

Court of Appeal

Haynes, C.

Criminal Appeal No. 109 of 1976

The State

and

Scantlebury

Appearances:

D.A.A. Robinson, S.C. for the petitioner.

E.A Romao, S.C., Director of Public Prosecutions, for the State.

Practice and Procedure - Bail

Haynes, C.

1 There is before this Court now an application in the form of a petition by and on behalf of Lynette Scantlebury, described as of the Georgetown Prisons, 12 Camp Street, Georgetown, in the County of Demerara, Guyana, now a patient in the Georgetown Hospital.” It is a petition for admission to bail pending the hearing of her appeal against both the sentence and her conviction by a jury at the present Demerara October Sessions of the High Court on the 25th day of October 1976, for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving.' The petitioner was sentenced to 6 (six) months' imprisonment taking effect from the 5th day of October 1976.

2 It is alleged in the petition and not disputed by the Director of Public Prosecutions who appeared for the State at the hearing in Chambers yesterday, that immediately before the trial judge passed sentence on the petitioner she collapsed in the dock, and after the sentence was pronounced, she was admitted a patient in the Georgetown Hospital where, presumably, she still is. Her petition states that she was taken to hospital “in a delirious coed and admitted a patient where she is still experiencing extreme pain, is under observation and receiving urgent medical care and treatment.” But this condition is not at all supported by any affidavit evidence of any medical practitioner under whose care the petitioner must be. This evidence should have been easy to obtain. I would have thought that such corroborative proof or maybe at least a medical certificate would have been made available to this Court. Applicants in matters of this kind should consider the advisability of assisting the judge who has to determine this matter with evidence of this nature if the condition of ill-health is to be relied on as a material consideration in deciding whether or not to admit the suppliant to bail.

3 The petitioner filed her appeal on the 2nd day of November 1976. In it she alleges that she was advised that this appeal not likely to be heard by this Court before a date “some time early in 1977.” I have consulted the Assistant Registrar of this Court and have accepted his statement that in the ordinary course of affairs this appeal is not likely to come on far hearing until about four to six months hence. And so in paragraphs 9 and 10 of her petition the petitioner stated as follows:

• “9. That your Petitioner is further advised by her sand Legal Adviser that her sentence of six months' imprisonment began to take effect from the 5th day of October 1976, being the first day of the Assizes during which the said sentence was passed since the Trial judge did not otherwise order; in the circumstances your petitioner would have in effect served three months of her sentence of imprisonment by the 5th January 1977.

• 10. That your petitioner is advised by the George town Prison Authorities that providing she is of good conduct she would receive a remission of sentence and that then her six months of imprisonment would expire on the 18th day of February 1977.”

4 But this is not all she relied on, for the petition went on to state:

• “12. That your petitioner's being in Prison pending the hearing of her appeal has caused great hardship to her family and she feels a great sense of anxiety about the care and welfare of her two daughters Althea (13) and Gerilyn (11).

• 13. That your petitioner's sense of anxiety is accentuated by her knowledge that her husband suffers from a chronic heart condition and she has been, in the past solely responsible for his domestic care and comfort, and also for the care and upbringing of the abovementioned children.”

5 Here again, no supporting medical evidence is annexed and tendered. And I would record here the identical comment written earlier in this ruling in relation to the present state of health of the petitioner herself. From the narrative of the facts alleges, the petitioner is asking the court to admit her to bail on the grounds of: (a) her own ill-health; (b) her husband's ill-health; (c) the great hardship imposed on her family, including her daughters Althea (13) and Gerilyn (11); and (d) the real likelihood that her appeal will come on for hearing after she shall have served her sentence. I would say without any hesitancy whatever that, at least in the circumstances of this case, grounds (a), (b) and (c), separately or cumulatively will not warrant her admission to bail. It is one of the unavoidably harsh and painful consequences of conviction and imprisonment that the immediate and close family of the convicted person will suffer hardships. It is impermissible generally to treat this factor as a ground for the grant of bail. As regards hers or her husband's state of health, this Court makes two observations: One is, that it is conceivable without difficulty that an appellant's state of health might be, in certain circumstances, a ground on which to admit her to bail. But, as at present advised, I am of the opinion that the circumstances must be very special indeed to make the state of health of the appellant's husband by itself, if at all, such a ground or an auxiliary one. In this case, it certainly is not. The other observation is, that the allegations as regards their state of health are unsupported by any medical evidence whatever. I will concede that it is not at all wholly inconceivable that in certain particular circumstances grounds (a), (b) and (c) cumulatively might justify a grant of bail. But they certainly do not do so in this case. Accordingly, in any event, I would not act on these grounds. I think, however, that the fourth ground deserves careful consideration.

6 Undoubtedly, this court has the jurisdiction to admit an appellant to bail pending the determination of an appeal. It is accepted law that it is a matter of discretion. An appellant has no common law or statutory or constitutional right to bail. But like all other discretionary powers it must be exercised judicially. If appellants are admitted to bail freely on appeals from the verdict of juries, a dangerous situation could arise inimical to the public interest. In England, under the Court of Criminal Appeal Act 1907, a similar statutory discretion to admit an appellant to bail existed until its repeal. A study of the many judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal there would indicate the considerations by which that court did so and its successor is guiding itself in the exercise of this discretion.

7 These authorities are clear that the circumstances must be “exceptional” to justify the grant of bail to persons convicted by juries: Gordon, (1912) 7 C.A.R. 182; Gott, (1921) 16 C.A.R. 86; Wise, (1922) 17 C.A.R. 17; The Duke of Leinster, (1923) 17...