Ramson v Barker et Al
| Jurisdiction | Guyana |
| Judge | Jhappan, C.J.,George, J.A.,Bishop, J. |
| Judgment Date | 17 May 1982 |
| Neutral Citation | GY 1981 CA 2 |
| Docket Number | Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1980 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Guyana) |
| Date | 17 May 1982 |
Court of Appeal
Jhappan, C.J., George and Bishop, JJ.A
Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1980
B.O. Adams S.C. associated with A. Chase for the appellant.
J.C. Nurse associated with Ramgopaul for the respondents.
Constitutional law - Fundamental rights and freedoms — Right to personal liberty — Appellant filed an originating notice of motion in the High Court against the respondents — Appellant claimed that several of his fundamental rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitution had been violated — Motion was dismissed — Appellant appealed against the order of dismissal — Finding of the court that the appellant was entitled to a declaration against the second respondent that his right to personal liberty as guaranteed by article 5 of the Constitution had been violated — Monetary compensation of $100.00 was awarded as redress.
I have had the pleasure of reading the decision of my learned brother George, J.A. I agree with both his reasons and conclusions and I concur with the order he proposes, I have nothing to add.
On the 2 nd November 1979 the appellant filed an originating, notice of notion in the High Court against the respondents, the first of whom being at all material times the Commissioner of Police. He claimed that several 0f his fundamental rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitution had been, violated. His oration was dismissed and he now appeals to this Court against the order of dismissal.
What transpired immediately prior to the breaches complained of were narrated by the trial judge in the following words:
On the evening of the 22 nd August 1979 about 4.00 to 4.30 p.m. a large crowd of people had assembled at the corner of Campbell Avenue and Delph Street, Campbellville. Their purpose was to listen to the speakers of a newly formed political party, the Working Peoples' Alliance who were preparing to address them. The meeting, so say the police authorities, was not sanctioned by them. It was necessary for the convenors to give them notice in writing as required by the Public Order Act, Cap. 16: 03 s.3(1)(G), and, as there was no such notice the meeting became an unlawful assembly and it was necessary to disburse the gathering. The crowd, however, did not leave the scene altogether; several pockets of persons persisted in remaining together in nearby yards some two hours after the police had broken up the assembly. The appellant together with a Mr. Chang, both of whom are attorneys-at-law, arrived in Sheriff Street about 6.10 p.m. They had both intended to attend the meeting. At about 7.30 to 8.00 p.m. he, Mr. Chang and another were standing on the western side of his motor car which was parked in Sheriff Street facing north some 500 yards north of Campbell Avenue which runs east and west and is at right angles with Sheriff Street. The right wheels of the car were on the eastern parapet of the street whilst the left wheels were on the road surface about one foot west of its eastern edge. They were discussing the action of police in dispersing the crowd. While there a policeman in uniform which was devoid of any regulation numbers came up,”
As to the actual acts complained of on which the appellant founded his claim, the learned trial judge accepted that the assault was committed in the manner described by him. The appellant had said that the policeman who came up pulled his left arm, spun him around and demanded to know who was the owner of the car. After this information was supplied he then proceeded to ask the appellant the reason for his presence on the road; whereupon the appellant replied that that was his business. This caused the policeman to apply greater pressure to appellant's arm resulting in his fingernail penetrating the muscles of the arm. The appellant pointed out to the policeman that he was assaulting him and demanded to know his name and number. The policeman applied greater force and shaped up to hit him with a staff which he had. At this same time another policeman jabbed him with a night-stick, in his ribs. By then about a dozen other policemen had come up, three of whom were officers whom the appellant recognised. None of them wore the usual regulation numbers. The appellant called one of, the officers, a deputy superintendent of police and the most senior rank present, by his surname and drew his attention to what had been happening. From his response it would appear that the officer took umbrage to being addressed by his surname. He was told by a policeman that the two men were lawyers and the officer remarked rather derisively “so what, we just lock up another one.” In the meanwhile the policeman who had been jabbing the appellant continued to do so and ordered him to enter his car. He complied reluctantly and drove away.
On the 10 th September 1979 the appellant's legal adviser wrote to the first respondent. The letter capsuled the incident at Sheriff Street and requested the following information:
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a) the names and numbers of the persons detailed to carry out police duty;
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b) whether any members of the party had less or more than three months service as a policeman and the names of those persons;
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c) the name and rank of the officer in command of the persons so detailed.
The Commissioner's reply was dated the 18 th October 1979. In effect he rejected the requests stating that he had “formed the opinion that a Commissioner of Police should not be liable to be privately (sic) interrogated…in respect of the deployment of police personnel.” He however invited the appellant to make a detailed report, if he had not already done so, in order that a full police investigation may be set in train. The appellant did not comply with this suggestion.
As regards the proferred investigation, it had bean contended before the trial judge by counsel for the respondents that under s.4(1) of the Police (Discipline) Act, Cap. 17:01, both the use of unnecessary violence by a member of the force to any person with whom he may be brought into contact in the execution of his duty, and the concealment or disguise of his number have been deemed offences against discipline; and under s.5(1) it is obligatory on the police to investigate every alleged commission of any offence against discipline under the Act. He argued that any punishment which may have been meted out against the guilty policeman would have been an adequate alternative remedy available to the appellant within the contemplation of art. 19 of the Constitution. Accordingly, he urged the court to eschew the grant of such constitutional reliefs as otherwise may have been available to the appellant. However, the learned trial judge declined counsel's invitation to pronounce on this submission and chose to ground his decision on the interpretation which had recently been given by this Court to meaning of the word ‘hindered’ in art. 12(1) of the Constitution in the case of Hope v. New Guyana Co. Ltd., (1979) 26 W.I.R. 233.
In his motion, as at the trial, the appellant had complained three of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under Cap. II of the Constitution have been violated. There were his freedom of expression (art. 12); ‘freedom of assembly (art. 13); and freedom of movement (art. 14). More specifically he claimed that at the time of ‘the attack on his person, he and his colleague were lawfully on a public way engaged in what was a permissible discussion, namely, the attitude of the police in their dispersal of the crowd which had gathered to hear the speakers at the proposed meeting. In pronouncing for the reasonableness of the action of the police in dispersing the crowd, the learned trial judge had this to say:
“As it seems to me there exists for examination in order to determine whether there was reasonably apprehended a breach of the peace these important facts which I have already stated; there were crowds of people albeit small pockets of them still in the neighbourhood of the intended meeting place, they were congregating in nearby yards and other places in the vicinity thereof. The police were evidently taking no chances; they apprehended a breach of the peace was likely to occur and they wanted the area cleared of people and parked vehicles. This is clear enough, because, before they accosted Ramson they did not know who he was; they did not know he was a lawyer or the fact that he was speaking to his colleague about police action and methods used by them to disperse a crowd of some 3000 to 4000 people. In my view had the police known the subject-matter of their discourse, that alone would have been sufficient justification for ordering them to move on; that would have certainly been ample justification for fearing that a crowd might gather around them in an atmosphere that was already charged with and prone to violence and ample grounds for holding that a breach of the peace was likely to occur. It seems to me ironical that on Mr. Ramson's own admission, he and his colleague were together speaking of, if not criticising, the methods of crowd dispersal and control by the police, and he has now chosen to make that fact the basis for launching this constitutional motion.”
As I understand the rationale of the learned trial judge the original act of dispersal was justified as the police had had no notification of the meeting in accordance with s.3(1) of the Public Order Act, Cap 16:03. Accordingly, they were acting under sub-sec. (4) when they caused the meeting to be dispersed. And although the crowd dispersed from the meeting place pockets of people gathered in nearby yards and a large number assembled some distance away an Sheriff Street in the vicinity of and on the bridge leading to the Campbellville Government School.
This must have conveyed to the police the impression that the crowd intended to defy their direction to disperse and...
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